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TITLE VII's EXEMPTION FOR RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS:
CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED OR
CONSTITUTIONALLY
FORBIDDEN?
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,' proscribes
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.2 It prohibits discrimination in employment in both the
private and public sectors;3 the power of the enforcing agency, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),4 reaches all
employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce who employ at
least fifteen employees. 6 There are, however, statutory exceptions 7 and
one express exemption from the provisions of title VII.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e to e-17 (1974).
2. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (1574).
3. As originally enacted in 1964, the Civil Rights Act did not apply to the public
sector. In 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) was amended to include as "persons" covered
under title VII, "governments, governmental agencies or political subdivisions." Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103,
amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to serve as the Civil Rights Act's enforcing agency. Originally only empowered
to make a recommendation to the Attorney General to intervene in an aggrieved
individual's civil action, in 1972 the EEOC was granted the authority to, itself, intervene
in a civil action brought under title VII by a private party against a party other than a
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(g) (6)
(1974).
5. The use of the broad "affecting commerce" standard reflects Congress' strong
commitment to the social policy the Act represents. The same standard appears in other
legislation impacting the employment arena. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1970); Age Discrimination Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970);
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
6. The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (1974). Accord, Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Associa-
tion, 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972); see Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp.
432 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), affjd, 454 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972).
7. It should be noted that two exceptions from title VII significantly affect religious
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, The one exemption from the mandates of title VII appears in section
702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.' It provides, simply,
that the nondiscrimination provisions of title VII will not be applied to
religious institutions with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion for the performance of work connected with the ac-
tivities of such institutions. Section 702 reads, in pertinent part:
This subchapter shall not apply. . . to a religious corporation, associ-
ation, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with
the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution,
or society of its activities.9
The section thus carves out an exemption from title VIrs coverage
for a class of enterprises-those organized for religious purposes-
which would otherwise come within the broad definition of "employer"
under the subchapter. While section 702 does not permit discrimination
on the basis of sex, color, race, or national origin, it does expressly
permit an exempted enterprise to hire and employ employees using
religion as a selection criterion, regardless of the nature of the job the
employee is hired to perform.10 Although section 702 does not grant an
unlimited exemption to religious institutions, it has evoked serious con-
organizations. One major exception permits the hiring and employment of employees on
the basis of their religion, sex, or national origin for positions for which such qualities
are bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs) reasonably necessary to the normal
business operations of an enterprise. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (1974). Neither race
nor color can be considered a BFOQ. However, during consideration of the section in
Congress, Senator Clark of Pennsylvania noted:
Although there is no exemption in title VII for occupations in which race might
be deemed a bona fide job qualification, a director of a play or movie who wished
to cast an actor in the role of a Negro, could specify that he wished to hire some-
one with the physical appearance of a Negro-but such a person might actually be
non-Negro. Therefore, the act would not limit the director's freedom of choice.
110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964).
The second exception from title VII permits schools and other educational institutions
which are supported or controlled by a particular religion to hire and to employ
employees on the basis of that religion. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (2) (1974).
8. 42U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1 (1974).
9. Id.
10. The limited exemption from coverage in this section f§ 7021 for religious cor-
porations, associations, educational institutions or societies has been broadened to
allow such entities to employ individuals of a particular religion in all their activi-
ties instead of the present limitation to religious activities. Such organizations re-
main subject to the provisions of title VII with regard to race, color, sex, or national
origin.
118 CONG. RIc. 7167. But see McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972). There the court found that a religious institution was,
in effect, totally exempt from title VII requirements with respect to its transactions with
its ordained ministers.
19751
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
stitutional inquiry." It is the purpose of this comment to demonstrate
the unconstitutionality of section 702 on the ground that it violates the
establishment clause 12 of the first amendment to the Constitution.
11. TEE E XTENT OF FREE EXERCISE PROTECTION GRANTED
TO A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION
A determination of the extent of the free exercise protection13 accord-
ed a religious institution is necessary to reach the issue of the constitu-
tionality of section 702. The extent of this protection will determine the
degree to which an exemption from title VII is constitutionally required.
If all activities of a religious institution are found to be constitutionally
immune from all attempts at government interference, then it would
be unconstitutional not to exempt them from the nondiscrimination
provisions of title VII with respect to sex, color, race, and national
origin. Similarly, if only some activities are to be fully protected, or if all
activities are to be only partially protected, an accommodation to the
mandates of title VII would need to be fashioned by means of a properly
formulated exemption. In essence, the failure to appropriately exempt
would force a religious organization to affirmatively comply with certain
provisions of title VII which would, in turn, interfere with its free
exercise of religion.
An analysis of the extent of the free exercise clause protection granted
to religious institutions entails two separate inquiries. First, what is the
nature of the protection granted under the free exercise clause? That is,
does establishing a nexus between a religious institution's doctrine and
its activities immunize the institution from liability for discrimination on
bases other than religion? Second, what are the limits of the free exercise
clause protection? That is, what kinds of activities can a religious
institution rightfully claim fall within the category of religious activities
deserving constitutional protection?
A. The Free Exercise Right of a Religious Institution
That religious enterprises, like persons, have a constitutional right to
the free exercise of their religion was firmly established in Kedroff v. St.
11. See King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
996 (1974).
12. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...." U.S.
CONs'r. amend. I.
13. "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]
... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Nicholas Cathedral.4 The Kedroff case extended a judicial policy first
established in Watson v. Jones"5 where the Supreme Court refrained
from deciding anew which of two factions of the Presbyterian Church
was entitled to control certain real property. Instead, the Court claimed
it was bound by the ruling of the highest ecclesiastical body of the
Presbyterian Church, saying it would be so bound in all instances where
the issue to be decided involved a question of church discipline, faith,
ecclesiastical law, rule, or custom. 1
Kedroff involved the validity of a New York statute which had the
effect of transferring administrative control of the Russian Orthodox
Church in North America from Moscow to an authority selected by a
conference of American churches. The Supreme Court found the stat-
ute an unconstitutional interference with the Church's free exercise of
religion, holding that "llegislation that regulates church administration,
the operation of churches, [or] the appointment of clergy ... prohibits
the free exercise of religion."' 7
In the years following Kedroff, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the constitutional dimension of the policy of Watson, where no specific
legislation was involved, by upholding the right of religious institutions
to first amendment protection from judicial interference with religious
free exercise in those circumstances which would require inquiry into
issues of doctrine for the purpose of a judicial determination.' In
Bodewes v. Zuroweste'9 a state court indicated, however, that issues
not involving doctrine were not to be shielded from judicial scrutiny
and redress. In Bodewes, a priest sued his bishop for breach of the sal-
ary provision of his employment contract. The court asserted jurisdic-
14. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
15. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
16. In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should govern the civil
courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state
under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial au-
thority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories
to which this matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions
as final, and as binding on them, in their application of the case before them.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. Watson has been cited for over one hundred
years for the rule of non-interference where civil authorities would be required to use
religious doctrine as the criterion for a judicial determination. See, e.g., Simpson v. Wells
Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1974).
17. 344 U.S. at 107-08.
18. See Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God,
Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem.
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S.
190 (1960).
19. 303 N.E.2d 509 (111. Ct. App. 1973).
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tion over the dispute saying: "It was not the intent of [the first] amend-
ment. . . that civil and property rights should be unenforceable...
because the parties involved might be the church and members, offi-
cers, or the ministry of the Church."20
B. McClure v. Salvation Army
McClure v. Salvation Army2 directly challenged, on free exercise
grounds, the applicability of title VII to a religious organization. The
court's analysis dealt specifically with the issues of the limits and the
nature of the protection granted under the free exercise clause.
Mrs. Billie McClure, an officer and minister of the Salvation Army,
brought suit against the Army as her employer, claiming a violation of
title VII. By its express provisions at the time, section 70222 permitted
a religious institution to discriminate on the basis of religion with re-
spect to employment related to its religious activities. But it was Mrs.
McClure's contention that the Salvation Army had unlawfully discrimi-
nated against her on the basis of sex. She claimed, among other things,
that she had received less compensation and fewer benefits than had her
male counterparts in the organization. 23 The Salvation Army, not refut-
ing the substance of Mrs. McClure's allegations, maintained that the
court was without jurisdiction to hear the case.24 The Army argued that
it was not an employer and that Mrs. McClure was not an employee
under the Civil Rights Act. The Army went on to assert that even if the
court found the parties to fall within the definitions of title VII, it would
be totally exempt, under section 702, from compliance with the provi-
sions of title VII. Essentially the Army was claiming free exercise
20. Id. at 511.
21. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
22. At the time the case arose, the section 702 exemption read as it was originally
enacted in 1964, not as it was amended in 1972. During the McClure litigation section
702 provided in relevant part:
This title shall not apply . ..to a religious corporation, association, or society
with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, or society
of its religious activities ....
Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title vii, § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (emphasis added).
The "religious activity" language framed for the McClure court the issue of the limits
and nature of the freedom of religion required under the free exercise clause. Despite the
variance from the present language, the examination of the constitutionality of section
702 remains relevant since the court decided the case on the basis of the constitutional
protection that is generally extended to a religious enterprise.
23. 460 F.2d at 555.
24. Id.
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protection on all bases, i.e., religion, race, sex, color and national origin,
with respect to the carrying on of its religious activities.
The court found that it had jurisdiction under the Act over the
Salvation Army as an employer and over Mrs. McClure as an employee.
It then held that there was no overall statutory exemption from title VII
for religious institutions.
The language and legislative history of § 702 compel the conclusion
that Congress did not intend that a religious organization be exempted
from liability for discriminating against its employees on the basis of
race, color, sex or national origin with respect to their compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
2 5
Finding no statutory exemption from the dictates of title VII, the
court next considered whether the obligations imposed on a religious
institution by title VII were violative of the Constitution. It concluded,
without deciding the full extent of free exercise protection accorded to a
religious institution, that at least the relationship between a church
and its minister was constitutionally immune from the dictates of title
VII. The court said:
The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its life-
blood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks
to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily
be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.
26
The court appeared to be adopting the Watson and Kedroff position
of defining certain actions of a religious institution as "doctrinal" and
then refraining from interfering with those actions. In Watson, the
activities the court found deserving of constitutional protection were
inextricably tied to ecclesiastical matters. And in Kedroff, the statute
which was invalidated had been enacted because the state legislature
determined it was necessary in order to "most faithfully carry out the
purposes of [a] religious trust"-a determination involving doctrinal
considerations.28 The court's position in McClure is also in accord with
25. Id. at 558.
26. Id. at 558-59. The justification for the court's position appears to be based on the
sanctity of the relationship between a church and its minister. But see Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969);
Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, Inc., 254
A.2d 162 (Md. Ct. App. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970), where the courts
asserted jurisdiction in disputes between a parent church and its subsidiary, arguably an
equally intimate relationship.
27. 460 F.2d at 559. But see Bodewes v. Zuroweste, 303 N.E.2d 509 (MI. Ct. App.
1973); text accompanying note 19 supra. There the court expressly did not extend free
exercise protection to civil matters in which a religious institution was involved.
28. 344 U.S. at 109.
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the Supreme Court's holding in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbish-
op. 29 There the Court refused to interfere with the decision of the
Archbishop of Manila not to appoint the petitioner to a chaplaincy,
stating:
Because the appointment is a canonical act, it is the function of the
Church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a
chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them.30
However, the court went a step further in McClure. It extended the
protection of the free exercise clause to matters peripheral to what
would appear to be the ecclesiastical dimensions of the church-minister
relationship:
Just as the initial function of selecting a minister is a matter of church
administration. . . so are the functions which accompany such a selec-
tion. It is unavoidably true that these include the determination of a
minister's salary, his place of assignment, and the duty he is to perform
in the furtherance of the religious mission of the church. 8'
Whether McClure can be interpreted as extending the limits of free
exercise protection to include all employment relationships involving
religious activities is an open question. The court seemed to indicate that
such an interpretation is warranted. It cited the Kedroff decision and
others as evidencing:
"[A] spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from
secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of church government as wel as
,those of faith and doctrine."32
Supporting this interpretation is King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC,3 where
both Kedroff and McClure were cited for the principle that the first
amendment requires the application of section 702 to the "religious ac-
tivities" of a religious institution. The court did not explain, however, its
interpretation of either the McClure decision or the "religious activi-
ties" language of section 702 as it existed at the time of McClure.
In addition to extending the limits of the free exercise clause protec-
tion to include a seemingly nondoctrinal category of activities, the
29. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
30. Id. at 16. The chaplaincy involved in Gonzalez was a position established by an
individual, by will, for the purpose of having a certain number of masses celebrated
annually. The Archbishop, applying religious, educational, and age criteria, found that
the young man claiming the chaplaincy under the will was not qualified for the position.
Id. at 17.
31. 460 F.2d at 559.
32. Id. at 560, quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
33. 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
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McClure court extended the nature of free exercise protection. 4 Not
only must a religious institution be permitted to discriminate on the
basis of religion within this ill-defined category of protected religious
activities, it must also be permitted to discriminate on whatever other
bases it deems necessary. The provisions of title VIE cannot be applied at
all to certain protected relationships and their "penumbral" activities
within a religious institution. 5 Mrs. McClure, as a minister of the
Salvation Army, had no protection, therefore, under title VII for actions
which discriminated disadvantageously against her on the basis of her
sex. It is important to note that while McClure significantly expanded
the free exercise protection guaranteed to a religious organization, it did
not find title VII unconstitutional for imposing certain nondiscrimina-
tion provisions on religious institutions. Instead, it held
that Congress did not intend, through the non-specific wording of the
applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relation-
ship between church and minister.86
An amicus curiae brief filed by the EEOC on behalf of Mrs. McClure
took issue with- the (anticipated) breadth of the court's decision. Its
position was that the first amendment's restriction on legislative and
34. Admittedly, it is difficult in many situations to differentiate the expansion of the
category of protected relationships or activities, i.e., the limits of protection, from the
nature of the protection being granted. Where the first amendment is held to protect
seemingly nonecclesiastical matters, it may be enlarging the category and affording
protection of a new kind. The following illustrations are intended to clarify the
distinction.
It has been established that the decision of a bishop not to appoint a chaplain who
admits he or she is an atheist would be immune from judicial interference because it
involves making a determination on religious grounds for a position intimately connected
with religious activities. However, if a bishop did not permit a black person to assume a
chaplaincy because he or she was Black (no tenet of the church mandating exclusively
Caucasian chaplains) and the court declined to consider the issue, it would be granting
first amendment protection of a nonreligious nature. This is analogous to Mrs.
McClure's charge of sex discrimination and the court's disposition of her claim. Finally,
if a civil contract for employment of a chaplain were breached and a court refused to
exercise its jurisdiction to hear the disute claiming it was a protected transaction under
the first amendment, the court would be enlarging the category of activities to which it
granted constitutional protection, thus extending the limits of that protection. This is
possibly analogous to the inclusion of the setting of a minister's salary as a protected ac-
tivity in McClure.
35. We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment
relationship existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church
and its minister would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of
religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment.
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 533, 560 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896
(1972).
36. Id. at 560-61.
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judicial interference with religion extends only to prohibiting the state
from interpreting tenets of faith or doctrine. Therefore, issues of salary
and job placement-even of ministers-would not fall within the first
amendment's protection.1
This position is now being asserted by Betty Boone Schiess, one of the
recently ordained women Episcopalian priests. In August of 1975, Ms.
Schiess filed complaints with the New York State Division of Human
Rights and the EEOC charging Bishop Ned Cole with unlawful discrim-
ination on the basis of sex for not permitting her to perform the religious
activities normally performed by a priest. According to the national
magazine which reported her action,3" Ms. Schiess' complaints contend
that "secular laws permitting a church to practice discrimination in
employment are meant to exclude only persons who do not share its
beliefs." 3 9
Ms. Schiess' objection to title VII parallels that of Mrs. McClure;
they both focus directly on the nature of the first amendment protection
afforded religious institutions in their dealings with their religious lead-
ers. The case could result in a determination of the full scope of a re-
ligious institution's constitutional immunization from title VII.
C. Section 702, As Amended
A consideration of the McClure case is only the first step in an
analysis of the extent of a religious institution's constitutional immunity
from title VII. When McClure was decided in 1972, section 702 shield-
ed a religious institution from liability for discrimination on the basis of
religion with respect to employment involved with the institution's reli-
gious activities. 40 Later that year, section 702 was amended to provide a
broader exemption for religious institutions from title VII:
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation,
37. "A decision on the merits in this case simply does not require the trial court to
weigh the federal interest in Title VII against a conflicting religious doctrine, nor
evaluate any of the Salvation Army's theology." Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 28,
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
38. TIME, Aug. 18, 1975, at 36.
39. Id. The jurisdictional requirements of title VII do not provide for the filing of a
civil action under the section before the expiration of one hundred and eighty days from
the filing of a charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f) (1974). The EEOC
charge is not considered to be filed until sixty days after proceedings are commenced
under the state law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c) (1974). Therefore a decision in the
Schiess case will not be quickly forthcoming.
49. See note 22 supra,
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association, educational institution, or society with respect to the em-
ployment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work con-
nected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution, or society of its activities.
41
The McClure court found that total protection-i.e. on all bases
recognized in title Vil-is required under the free exercise clause for the
still undefined category of religious activities of a religious institution.
But, because of the formulation of the section 702 exemption at the
time, it never reached the issue of whether or not such protection, or any
protection, is constitutionally extended to all activities of a religious
institution.
The only case to consider this issue is King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC.42
In King's Garden, the petitioner was a religious non-profit charitable
association whose organization included a number of ministeries. King's
Garden was also the licensee of two radio stations which broadcasted
predominantly religious and inspirational programming. In its suit
against the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), it maintained
that the policy of the broadened section 702 exemption was to be super-
imposed onto the FCC's anti-bias rules, thereby permitting the radio
station to discriminate on religious grounds with respect to the hiring
and employment of all its employees. King's Garden's position was that
the broad exemption was necessary in order for the organization to pur-
sue its religious goals.43 Although admitting on one hand that some of
the organization's activities could be performed by nonreligious per-
sons,44 it asserted on the other that each of its employees performed an
essential role in the religious mission of King's Garden.45 It followed,
therefore, that in order to be qualified for employment at King's
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1 (1974) (emphasis added).
42. 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
43. Brief for Petitioner at 29, King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner]. It is
interesting to note that King'4 Garden's original claim to the FCC maintained that it was
proper, under title VIrs BFOQ exception, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (1974), to
impose a religious requirement on its applicants and employees. However, in its brief to
the Court of Appeals, King's Garden expressly conceded that although it believed that all
of its employees were carrying out an essentially religious mission, "they may be engaged
in activities that can be performed by non-religious persons." Id. at 25. The statutory
standard under title VII for a BFOQ exception requires the challenged selection criterion
to be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [a] particular business or
enterprise." King's Garden's admission clearly refuted its prior contention that religion
would qualify as a BFOQ, and by the time the case reached the court, the claim had been
abandoned.
44. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 43, at 25.
45. Id. at29.
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Garden, an applicant or an employee must be sympathetic to its basic
philosophy. 46 The application of the narrow FCC exemption, instead
of the broad section 702 exemption, would inhibit the hiring of quali-
fied-i.e. properly sympathetic-employees. This inhibition, King's
Garden claimed, would violate the organization's rights under the free
exercise clause.47
Insofar as the state requires a religious organization to employ persons
not in sympathy with its basic philosophy, it is hampering and burdening
the right of that organization to pursue its religious activities according
to its beliefs. It was the recognition of this basic fact-that the secular
and the divine cannot be compartmentalized-that prompted Congress
to expand the religious exemption of the Civil Rights Act to all activities
of a religious organization. 48
The court rejected the position of King's Garden, stating that the
myriad "activities" which would be immunized were section 702 ap-
plied by the FCC "have not the slightest claim to protection under the
Free Exercise . . . guarantees." 49
Another analysis of King's Garden has suggested that, following
Wisconsin v. Yoder,"' a broad section 702 exemption is required to
permit a religious institution to use "its own resources to shield its
members from the importunities of the secular world or of competing
46. Id. at 25. The briefs filed by the Federal Communications Commission and by
the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc., and the
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ, amici curiae on behalf of Re-
spondents in King's Garden, noted that a distinction should be made between religious
"belief" and religious "conduct." Citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) and
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the briefs noted that conduct which is
motivated by religious belief may be regulated but that belief, alone, may not be. They
suggested that an exemption for religious institutions, less broad than section 702, would
be regulating religion-motivated conduct, and not the belief itself. Brief for Respondents
at 24, King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996
(1974); Brief for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California,
Inc, and Office of Communication of United Church of Christ as Amici Curiae at 5,
King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974).
As to what constitutes a religious belief or activity, see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78 (1944); Folett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
47. Id. It should be noted here that the FCC rule resembles the original version of
section 702 in that the exemption grants freedom to choose employees on the basis of
religion for an activity of a strictly religious nature--on-the-air espousal of religious
philosophy.
48. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 43, at 25.
49. 498 F.2d at 56.
50. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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faiths."' 1 But the circumstances of the Amish sect in Yoder were highly
unusual. 52 The desire of the Amish to shield themselves from the secu-
lar world was based on their long-established religious beliefs, and was
considered by the Court to be essential to the preservation of their
religion. 53 Not so in King's Garden or in most contemporary situations
where, although the employer is a religious institution, the employees
spend their non-working hours in the secular world. "Thus," said the
Supreme Court in Yoder,
if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation
and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the ma-
jority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and iso-
lated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious
basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than re-
ligious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses.5 4
D. Other Social Legislation and the Free Exercise Clause
An analysis of the exemptions given to religious institutions by social
legislation other than the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,55 is
instructive in determining the extent of free exercise protection such
institutions require.
The Fair Labor Standards Act56 (FLSA) is the federal enactment of
most general application affecting workers' wages and hours. It applies
to employees or to enterprises engaged in interstate commerce or in the
production of goods for interstate commerce. Religious corporations or
other institutions which meet the commerce criterion5 7 and which may
51. Note, The Constitutionality of the 1972 Amendment to Title VIi's Exemption for
Religious Organizations, 73 MIcH. L Rxv. 538 (1975).
52. " heir rejection of telephones, automobiles, radios, and television, their mode of
dress, of speech, their habits of manual work do indeed set them apart from much of
contemporary society." 406 U.S. at 217.
53. Nor is the impact of the compulsory-attendance law confined to grave interfer-
ence with important Amish religious tenets from a subjective point of view. It car-
ries with it precisely the kind of objective 'danger to the free exercise of religion
that the First Amendment was designed to prevent. As the record shows, compul-
sory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very real
threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist to-
day; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or
be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region.
id. at 218.
54. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e to e-17 (1974); see notes 1-10 supra.
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-16 (1970).
57. The Fair Labor Standards Act does not extend to employees or enterprises which
merely affect commerce and so excludes commerce of an inconsequential volume from its
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be subject to a dollar volume requirement58 are enterprises which are
covered by the Act.
In Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp.,5 9 a challenge was made
to the FLSA's applicability to a religious corporation. The Court of
Appeals, in holding the Act applicable, stated:
It seems clear, in the instant case, that the Fair Labor Standards Act
is such a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation by an Act of Con-
gress, a regulation in the interests of society for the welfare of all work-
ers,. . . [that it] does not violate the Constitutional provisions guaran-
teeing the free exercise of religion.60
The FLSA has been interpreted, however, by the Federal Wage and
Hour Administration, as exempting from its provisions eleemosynary,
educational, religious and similar activities of organizations operated
not for profit.
61
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19702 (OSHA) requires
each covered employer to provide a place of employment free from
hazards likely to cause serious injury or death. It does not expressly
exempt religious institutions from its provisions. The Department of
Labor, two years after OSHA's enactment into law, clarified the policy
regarding the Act's power over such institutions:
Churches or religious organizations, like charitable and non-profit or-
ganizations, are considered employers under the Act where they employ
one or more persons in secular activities. As a matter of enforcement
policy, the performance of, or participation in, religious services (as dis-
tinguished from secular or proprietary activities whether for charitable
or religion-related purposes) will be regarded as not constituting em-
ployment under the Act.63
The National Labor Relations Act 64 (NLRA), originally enacted in
regulation. Noonan v. Fruco Const. Co., 140 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1943); Couch v. Ward,
168 S.W.2d 822 (Ark. 1943).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (s) (4) exempts from the dollar volume requirement ($250,000
annual gross volume of sales) certain non-profit hospitals, other institutions for the ill,
and a broad category of schools. The enumerated enterprises are automatically deemed to
be activities performed for a business purpose for a determination of whether or not they
qualify as covered enterprises.
59. 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1954).
60. Id. at 885.
61. See, e.g., Wage and Hour Opinion Letter No. 927, May 29, 1968, CCH WAoEs-
HouRs 1 25,195.69; Wage and Hour Opinion Letter No. 1037, December 31, 1969, CCH
WAGEs-HoURs 25,185.022.
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1975.4(c) (1) (1975) (emphasis added).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
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1935 and subsequently amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,5
changed the nature of industry in the United States by legislatively
protecting the trade union movement.6 6 To best effectuate the Act's
broad social policy, the jurisdiction of the Act's enforcing agency, the
National Labor Relations Board, was made co-extensive with that of the
commerce clause. There is no express exemption for religious institu-
tions under the Act and, as a general rule, the Board will exercise
jurisdiction over a religious institution when its "purely commercial
activities" affect commerce.6 7 The motivation of the institution, i.e.
support of its religious activities, is immaterial to the Board's assertion
of jurisdiction where the enterprise affects commerce.68
The most well-known benefit a religious organization enjoys, but
which is denied to its secular counterpart, is its exemption from
taxation.69 However, where a religious organization organized and
operated exclusively for religious purposes achieves business income
unrelated to its religious activities, such income will be taxed."
65. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1970).
66. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
67. Ming Quong Children's Center, 210 N.L.R.B. No. 125; 86 L.R.R.M. 1254, 1256
(1974); see Good Foods Manufacturing & Processing Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 418 (1972);
First Church of Christ, Scientist, 194 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1972). But cf. Lutheran Church,
Missouri Synod, 109 N.L.R.B. 859 (1954) where the Board did not exercise jurisdiction
over a church owned and operated radio station on a Lutheran seminary campus saying
it would not decide whether or not the station engaged in interstate commerce. (Two
dissenting Board members found that it was an instrumentality or channel of interstate
commerce.) Instead, the Board merely asserted that the policies of the Act would not be
effectuated by the assumption of jurisdiction over an organization which operated on a
non-profit basis in connection with, and in furtherance of, its religious objectives.
68. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 194 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1008 (1972).
69. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (3). The rationale behind the government grant
of tax exemptions to religious and similar organizations was expressed by the court in
Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 853-54 (10th
Cir. 1972):
The exemption to corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable,
religious, educational or other purposes carried on for charity is granted because
of the benefit the public obtains from their activities and is based on the theory
that: ". . . the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations
from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general
welfare."
H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939).
70. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 511-12. In Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church,
404 U.S. 412 (1972), a Florida statute was challenged on first amendment grounds for
granting a tax exemption for church property used as a commercial parking lot. Before
the case reached the Supreme Court, the law was changed to permit an exemption for
church property only when it is used predominantly for religious purposes. The Supreme
Court, with Justice Douglas dissenting, held that the issue had become moot. No similar
case has subsequently arisen to test the practice of granting only limited (i.e., for
religious activities) tax exemptions to religious institutions.
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Under the Internal Revenue Code then, and under each piece of
major legislation cited above, religious institutions are granted limited
exemptions from the obligations imposed on all other affected employ-
ers-exemptions which shield only the religious activities of the religious
institutions. Challenges made to the limited exemptions, on the basis of
legislatively denying a religious institution free exercise protection, have
consistently failed.71 By providing an exemption for all activities of a
religious institution, title Vii's section 702 is inconsistent with the
treatment traditionally afforded such institutions by Congress. This
lends support to a thesis that section 702 grants to religious institutions
more freedom of religious exercise than is actually required under the
Constitution.
E. The Balancing Test Under the Free Exercise Clause
In the final analysis, a religious institution's claim to free exercise
protection must be balanced against society's competing interest which
would deny such protection. Where religious claims prevail, they will
be deemed to be deserving of constitutional protection.
The standard by which the government's interest is measured against
the claimed right of free exercise has been described in terms of "a
compelling state interest. ' 72 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 7  speaking of the
weight to be given to the conflicting considerations, the Supreme Court
stated: "The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject
is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of reli-
gion."'74 Thus, where conduct in accordance with religious beliefs inter-
feres with compelling societal interests (usually in the form of a legisla-
tive mandate), religious conduct may be legitimately subject to
restriction. 75 Or, to put it another way, religious interests, in those
circumstances, are not entitled to constitutional protection.
The state has met its burden in the past and has consequently been
permitted to enforce its laws despite infringement on the right to free
exercise: where public safety required prohibiting children from selling
71. See, e.g., cases cited at notes 59, 67, 68 & 70, supra.
72. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963).
73. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
74. Id. at 215.
75. Here the conflict is between a legislative exemption representing the religious
interest and a legislative mandate as applicable to the rest of society and, presumably,
serving its interests.
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religious literature'ih the streets;76 where public welfare mandated up-.
holding Sunday closure laws despite impairment of Orthodox Jews'
livelihoods; 77 where morality compelled outlawing polygamy despite its
mandate in religious doctrine;78 and where public health necessitated
ordering vaccinations for public school children against parents' reli-
gious objections. 79 In each of these cases, the prevailing state interest
was one of broad social policy with widespread impact on society's
health, safety or welfare.
In contrast, the government failed to make an adequate showing in
Sherbert v. Verner,80 where eligibility for state unemployment benefits
was held not to depend on an applicant's availability for work on
Saturday, and in Yoder, where public school attendance up to the age of
sixteen was not enforced when it would have had a detrimental effect on
the survival of the Amish religious community. In Sherbert, the resultant
impact of the invalidation of the challenged legislation on society's
health, safety, or general welfare was minimal. In Yoder this was not
true, the state's interest in compulsory education being as broad and
compelling a social policy as any on which the government has pre-
vailed. However, in Yoder, the state's interest was outweighed by the
possibility of destruction of an entire religious community-not just an
incidental interference with free exercise of religion.81 Further, it was
tempered by the recognition that the state's objectives in compulsory
education would be "otherwise served" by the substantially similar goals
of the Amish community."'
Of the two categories of free exercise clause cases described above,
the former seems to more accurately represent the balancing of inter-
ests involved in a determination of the requisite breadth of the section
76. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
77. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
.78. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
79. Board of Educ. v. Maas, 152 A.2d 394 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 843 (1960).
80. 374U.S. 398 (1963).
81. "As the record shows, compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children
carries with it a very real threat of undermining Amish community and religious practice
as they exist today. . . ." 406 U.S. at 218.
82. The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education has enabled them
to function effectively in their day-to-day life under self-imposed limitations on rela-
tions with the world, and to survive and prosper in contemporary society as a sepa-
rate, sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient community for more than 200
years in this country. In itself this is strong evidence that they are capable of ful-
filling the social and political responsibilities of citizenship without compelled at-
tendance beyond the eighth grade at the price of jeopardizing their free exercise of
religious belief.
Id. at 225.
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702 exemption. The intent of title VII was to provide all qualified per-
sons equal access to all employment opportunities.8  Clearly, equal em-
ployment opportunity represents a governmental interest of the highest
order 84 and few doubt that this goal can be reached absent enforcement
of title VII. The broad exemption for religious institutions enacted in
section 702 permits such institutions to deny equal employment oppor-
tunity by discriminating on the basis of religion with respect to employ-
ment for positions which have no actual connection with the religious
function of the institution. Consequently, were religious institutions de-
nied the freedom to so discriminate, they would be suffering minimal
interference-if any-with the carrying on of the religious aspects of
their work or with the achievement of their religious goals. Balancing
this minimal interference with religion against an expanded opportunity
for equal employment, it is this writer's position, based on the review of
cases herein8 5 that the state's interest should prevail.
Section 702 presently protects activities heretofore denied protection
legislatively 8 (viz., unrelated to religious activities) and judicially 7
(viz., unrelated to doctrinal issues or ecclesiastical matters). It protects
activities the protection of which denies a compelling government inter-
est. Therefore, it is submitted that section 702 grants to a religious
institution more protection than is required under the free exercise
clause.
III. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
-That section 702 grants more freedom of religious exercise to reli-
gious institutions than is required under the Constitution does not mean
that the exemption is unconstitutional per se. A complete constitutional
analysis must necessarily include a balancing of the competing claims of
the establishment clause against the grant of free exercise as applied
under section 702. The extent to which each interest will be accom-
modated depends upon the nature of the competing interests and their
place in the constitutional hierarchy.
83. One of the basic principles of our way of life in America has always been that
individuals would be free to pursue the work of their own choice, and to advance
in that work, subject only to considerations of their individual qualifications, talents
and energies.
Statement by President Richard M. Nixon upon the signing into law the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, quoted in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
LAws AND RULEs You SHOULD KNOW, 2.
84. See note 74 supra.
85. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 56, 62, 64 & 69 supra.
87. See notes 14-19 supra.
[Vol. 9
TITLE VII RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION
A. King's Garden v. FCC
The free exercise clause protects an individual's (or institution's),
right to freedom from state interference with the exercise of religion.
The establishment clause assures that the state will do nothing to inhibit
that free exercise.8 8 But the establishment clause also mandates that the
state not support or sponsor religion in any way.89
The establishment clause, in Jefferson's words, was intended to erect
a "wall of separation between Church and State";90 when the state
touches the religious sphere, it must be evenhanded and neutral in its
operation.9 It must maintain a position of neutrality between believers
and non-believers and between competing groups of believers.9" But the
establishment clause is not so inflexible as to fail to recognize the
impossibility, in our complex and highly regulated society, of maintain-
ing the total separation of church and state. And so it permits religion to
"incidentally benefit" from specific acts of the government so long as the
government's action meets the three-part test developed by the Supreme
Court over years of dealing with establishment clause cases. As most
recently expressed in Committee For Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist,93 the test requires:
1) That the challenged law reflect a clearly secular legislative pur-
pose;
94
2) That the law have a primary effect which neither advances nor
inhibits religion; and9"
3) That application of the law not result in excessive entanglement of
the government with religionY6
The establishment clause and the free exercise clause work in con-
junction with one another within the parameters of the first amendment.
They function cooperatively although they are not perfectly intermesh-
ing parts of a defined whole. Religion can be afforded more protection
88. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 205
(1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
89. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
90. 8 JEFF. WoRxs 113, quoted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
91. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S, 437, 450 (1971).
92. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Cf. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC,
498 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974), where the court
comments: "Because the two religion guarantees often seem to tug in opposite directions,
'neutrality' is a notoriously difficult concept."
93. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
94. Id. at 773.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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than it actually requires under the free exercise clause without causing a
concomitant violation of the establishment clausef 7 But there exists a
point at which accommodation of free exercise impinges on the rights
guaranteed under the establishment clause. Whether or not this is the
situation under section 702 was the issue addressed in King's Garden."
The petitioner in King's Garden was a religious organization which
was the licensee of two radio stations broadcasting predominantly reli-
gious and inspirational programming. An applicant for employment
with one of the radio stations, Mr. Trygve J. Anderson, was asked to
complete a job application which required him to respond to questions
directly pertaining to his religious beliefs and practices. 99 Mr. Anderson
registered a letter of complaint with the FCC; it eventually led to
litigation in both administrative and judicial forums. 0 The letter
claimed that the questions contained in the application were being used
to discriminate against potential employees on improper grounds. 10
The FCC considered Mr. Anderson's claim in light of the Commis-
sion's guidelines which exempt sectarian licensees from the public inter-
est anti-bias rules with respect to employment "connected with 'the
espousal of the licensee's religious views."'1 2 Using this standard, the
Commission found King's Garden to be in violation of the rules. Since
not every position with the radio station required an employee's espousal
of King's Garden's religious views, a pre-employment screening criterion
based on religion was unnecessary and improper. The Commission so
informed King's Garden by letter, but before the Commission took any
final action against its licensee, Congress passed the 1972 amendment to
section 702.
In response to the Congressional action, King's Garden asked the
Commission to change its ruling, claiming that under title VIrs new
section 702, a religious institution was exempt from liability for discrim-
ination on religious grounds with respect to employment for positions
97. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
98. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996
(1974).
99. The application asked an applicant to respond to questions such as: "Are you a
Christian?" "How do you know you are a Christian?" "Is your spouse a Christian?" and
"Give a testimony." Brief for Respondents, supra'note 45, at 4.
100. In re Complaint by Anderson, 34 F.C.C.2d 937 (1972); In re Request of
National Religious Broadcasters, 43 F.C.C.2d 451 (1973), a!f'd, King's Garden, Inc. v.
FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
101. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 43, at 4.
102. See note 100 supra; the FCC's anti-bias rules appear in 47 C.F.R. § 73.301
(1969).
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connected with all of its activities.' 03 If this were so, King's Garden's
employment application questions relating to religion would be appro-
priate and valid screening criteria for all positions in the radio station.
The Commission, not disputing the meaning of the broadened section
702 exemption, replied that the Civil Rights Act was not part of its
enabling statute and that the change in section 702's coverage had no
effect at all on its rules and policies. 10 4 When the case was filed in the
Court of Appeals, the petitioner asking for a review of the FCC order,
the question presented was whether or not Congress intended -title VII to
superimpose its anti-discrimination provisions upon the FCC's existing
anti-bias rules. But the three-judge court did not confine itself to simply
answering the question presented; 105 it proceeded to analyze the
scope and constitutional validity of the amended section 702. Although
the court decided not to resolve the question of the exemption's constitu-
tionality, it presented all the evidence to support a finding of unconstitu-
tionality, concluding: "[It is reasonably clear that the 1972 exemption
violates the Establishment Clause . ... 106 In his concurring opinion,
Chief Judge Bazelon took a firmer stance than his brethren:
I am convinced by the reasoning of part I of the court's opinion that
Title VII's exemption of all "activities" of any "religious corporation,
association, educational institution or society" violates the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment.'
07
The position of the court in King's Garden was that the 1972
amended version of section 702, by granting religious institutions broad
immunity from liability for religious discrimination, gave a bene-
fit to religious institutions not shared by secular institutions. "Ulihe
wholesale exemption for religious organizations alone can only be
seen as a special preference."' 0 8 The court asserted that by covering
all of the "activities" of any "religious corporation, association, educa-
tional institution, or society,"
the exemption immunizes virtually every endeavor undertaken by a re-
ligious organization. If a religious sect should own and operate a truck-
ing firm, a chain of motels, a race track, a telephone company, a rail-
road, a fried chicken franchise or a professional football team, the enter-
103. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 43, at 7.
104. Brief for Respondents, supra note 45, at 9-10.
105. The court found that the FCC was "justified in finding the 1972 exemption
irrelevant to its regulation of broadcast licensees under the Communications Act."
498 F.2d at 58.
106. 498 F.2d at 54 n.7.
107. Id. at 61.
108. Id. at 55.
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prise could limit employment to members of the sect without infringing
the Civil Rights Act.
In creating this gross distinction between the rules facing religious and
non-religious entrepreneurs, Congress placed itself on a collision course
with the Establishment Clause.10 9
The court briefly analyzed the section 702 exemption in terms of the
Nyquist test, omitting consideration of the entanglement issue since the
broad hands-off policy of section 702 would produce just the opposite
effect. 10 It found, first, that the purpose of the exemption was not
remotely secular, pertaining as it did exclusively to religious organiza-
tions. "We cannot conceive what secular purpose is served by the
unbounded exemption enacted in 1972."' The court noted further that
the primary effect of section 702 clearly advanced religion, contrary to
the proscription of Nyquist, by inviting "religious groups, and them
alone, to impress a test of faith on job categories, and indeed whole
enterprises, having nothing to do with the exercise of religion."" 2
The King's Garden court acknowledged that some exemption from
legislative obligations was required in order to accommodate the free
exercise rights of a religious institution with respect to its religious
activities. But it also firmly believed that strictly secular activities of
religious institutions were not entitled to constitutional protections." 3
The Court of Appeals briefly reviewed a series of establishment clause
cases to support these propositions, 1 4 but it left to Congress the task of
fashioning an alternative, constitutionally sound, exemption. 1  Prefac-
109. Id. at 54-55 (footnote omitted).
110. Section 702 does not require interference with, nor surveillance of, an employer's
employment practices. Additionally, the broader the exemption, the less likely that a
religious employer would be charged with unlawful religious discrimination. Where a
formal charge is filed, there would necessarily be intervention by the EEOC and,
perhaps, the courts. Compare Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), where the
elimination of a tax exemption could have given rise to tax valuations of church
property, tax liens, tax foreclosures and the conflicts which ensue therefrom. Id. at 674.
111. 498 F.2d at 55.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970).
115. While it is not uncommon for courts to come very close to rewriting statutes
so as to save their constitutionality, the 1972 exemption is a poor candidate for such
a salvage operation. The scope of a religious exemption is an issue raising very
delicate questions of public policy. While it is reasonably clear that the 1972 ex-
emption violates the Establishment Clause, it is far less clear exactly how much,
or in what way, the exemption should be narrowed to avoid First Amendment ob-
jections. There may well be a considerable range of permissible alternatives. As
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ing its review with the observation that recent cases have expanded
religious exemptions beyond traditionally protected boundaries, the
court asserted that it could not find any precedent for the unlimited
breadth of section 702.116
B. Establishment Clause Analysis
Support for the King's Garden position is found in an analysis of the
following establishment clause cases. In Walz v. Tax Commission," 7 a
tax exemption for church-owned property was held to be permissible
"benevolent neutrality" on the part of the state.1" 8 The Court in Walz
noted that the limits of state accommodation to religion do not merely
encompass those rights protected under the free exercise clause; the state
may, without violating the establishment clause, grant exemptions addi-
tional to those mandated by the right to free exercise. 19
Zorach v. Clauson120 approved a state law which permitted public
school children to be released from school premises to attend-at no
cost to the public-religious instructional classes. The Supreme Court
found that the encouragement of religious instruction by the accommo-
dation and cooperation of a secular institution was not only not in
violation of the establishment clause, but was in "the best of our
traditions."'' And in both Tilton v. Richardson'12 and Hunt v.
McNair, 123 legislation granting aid to religious educational institutions
was upheld on the basis that the allotted funds would be used to
construct buildings and facilities for secular purposes.
Recognizing the seeming encroachment of free exercise protection
into the arena usually protected by the establishment clause, the point to
be made is that the decisions in all of the above noted cases were
painstakingly constructed. They clearly indicate that each step away
from the historical parameters of the establishment clause was based on
the unique set of facts before the Court. Each case found that the chal-
lenged legislative act had a secular purpose, a primarily secular effect,
a matter of institutional competence and constitutional authority, it is for the Con-
gress, not the courts, to choose among these.
498 F.2d at 54-55 n.7.
116. Id. at 56.
117. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
118. Id. at 676.
119. Id. at 673.
120. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
121. Id. at 313-14.
122. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
123. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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and only an incidental benefit to religion, all of which are in accordance
with former rulings.' 24 In contrast, section 702 "creates a classification
of a strictly religious character. And the exemption's benefits clearly
extend to the non-religious, commercial enterprises of sectarian organi-
zations."' 25 The result is a direct benefit to religious institutions and a
concomitant disadvantage to non-sectarian commercial enterprises. Both
the benefit and the preference are in violation of the establishment
clause for impermissibly supporting religion. 26 While part II of this
comment concluded that section 702 grants more free exercise protec-
tion than is constitutionally required, the foregoing analysis makes it
clear that section 702 grants more free exercise protection than is con-
stitutionally permitted..
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 702
The discussion in Parts I and II is distinguishable from the lack of
reasoned analysis by Congress prior to the passage of the amended sec-
tion 702. Although prolonged Congressional debate did occur, as an
indication of legislative intent it is more extensive than instructive. It
does not provide any support for finding section 702 constitutionally
sound.
It was the position of Senator Williams of New Jersey that the
legitimate and constitutional needs of religious institutions could be met
by the application of the original section 702 with the additional cover-
age of section 703's bona fide occupational qualification provision. 27
The latter section would permit a religious institution to use religion as a
selection criterion for positions which did not fall within the category of
religious activities but for which the employer could prove that religion
was a "reasonably necessary" qualification. 28 In many instances, how-
124. See, e.g., Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
125. 498 F.2d at 57 (citation omitted).
126. See notes 93-96 supra and accompanying text.
127. Section 703, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (1974), provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on
the basis of [their) religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. ...
128. In Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), the
court elaborated upon the test the employer is required to meet to successfully claim that
a challenged criterion is a BFOQ. Under Diaz, sex, religion or national origin will qual-
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ever, religion is irrelevant as a selection criterion for employment with a
religious institution and, therefore section 702 should suffice. Elaborat-
ig on this position, Williams said:
It should be emphasized that religious corporations and associations
often provide purely secular services to the general public without regard
to religious affiliation, and that most of the many thousands of persons
employed by these institutions perform totally secular functions. In this
regard, employees in these "religioug" institutions perform jobs that are
identical to jobs in comparable secular institutions. It seems appropri-
ate, therefore, that these persons employed by religious corporations and
associations should be given the same equal employment opportunities
as those persons employed in comparable positions by secular employ-
ers.1
29
The counter-arguments of the proponents of a broad section 702
exemption were apparently more persuasive than Williams'. They were
assuredly more eloquent. Plus they carried with them the influence of
the reputation of one of the speakers as a constitutional scholar. 3 ' Sen-
ator Ervin declared:
This section [an amended section 702 retaining the "religious activities"
limitation] would split the activities of a religious organization into two
segments, although they are irretrievably held mainly by the organiza-
tion itself. ,It would be so generous to the good Lord as to permit the
good Lord to retain jurisdiction over those employees of the religious
organizations who did work strictly in the religious field, but it would
arrogate to the Commission [the EEOC] jurisdiction of those employees
of the religious organizations whose work was more of a mundane na-
ture.
When the Federal Government begins to grasp the power of things of
the Lord, it is reaching a state of governmental intemperance which is
alien to the first amendment. The first amendment was designed to
build a wall of separation between church and state; the bill proposes
to -tear down, in part, that wall of separation and to give to Caesar some
of the jurisdiction over the affairs of the Lord. 131
The new section 702 was enacted into law on March 24, 1972.18
ify as a BFOQ when, without the application of such a criterion, a company would be
unable to perform its primary function or provide its primary service.
129. 118 CONG. R c. 1991-92 (1972). King's Garden took an analogous position. It
went a step further, however, and asserted that section 702 appeared to be unconstitu-
tional on fifth amendment due process clause grounds as violating the equal protection
rights of secular employers. 498 F.2d at 57.
130. 118 CONG. Rac. 1977 (1972).
131. Id.
132. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat.
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V. CONCLUSION
With all due respect to Senator Ervin, his arguments reveal more
rhetoric than reason. Clearly religion is a sensitive issue and govern-
ment's intervention into the religious arena is suspect. The hands-off
policy which led to the passage of the amended section 702 may have
been politically safe, but is it constitutionally sound? Because Congress
did not squarely address this issue, the dilemma will, inevitably, be
passed on to the judiciary. One hopes they will render unto it the
considered attention and analysis it warrants. Until they do, however,
and despite aspersions recently cast its way, section 702 will remain the
operable exemption for religious institutions under title VII.
Diane Nissim Wentworth
103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970). The amendments to section 702, known as
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, became effective one year after the
date of enactment, except for 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2, 3, 5, 6, which became effective
immediately.
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Because of the vast amount of important cases decided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review begins publication of the
Ninth Circuit Review in this volume. In each issue a section
of the Review will analyze significant cases or developments
within a particularized area of the law that have occurred
in the Ninth Circuit within the prior year. In this issue
two cases dealing with securities regulations and one dealing
with exclusionary zoning are analyzed, in order to give mem-
bers of the legal profession within the Ninth Circuit a better
understanding of the law as it has been decided by the Court
or Appeals.
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